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The Roots of the Millennium Development Goals:   
A Framework for Studying the History of Global 
Statistics 
Daniel Speich Chassé ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Ursprünge der Milleniums-Entwicklungsziele«. Global compara-
tive statistics have become a major mode of international political communica-
tion. One prominent case in point is the Millennium Development Goals as de-
fined by the United Nations in 2000. The article contributes to a critical 
discussion of their functioning by designing a framework for the study of glob-
al statistics. Historians of statistics have so far largely focused on the national 
level and posited a strong connection between calculating social instances and 
governing collectives. The category of the nation was one of the foremost ef-
fects of statistics, and numbers have helped in strengthening national institu-
tions. But what about the international realm in which the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals are located? The leading question of this article is to what extent 
a co-construction of statistics and political institutions can also be found in the 
analysis of global statistics. The focus lies on statistical practices in East Africa 
in the epoch of late imperial rule and during decolonization. The Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP) is of special interest. Statistical knowledge was surprisingly 
incomplete and became a major issue only with the formation of new states 
and new international organizations post-1945. Statistical knowledge as repre-
sented in the Millennium Development Goals works through a radical reduction 
of complexity and necessarily renders a biased image of the world. In contrast 
to the national level, on the international level no single center of calculation 
emerged with the growing power of statistics. 
Keywords: History of statistics, modern African history, history of international 
organizations, history of development, imperial history, history of economic 
thought. 
1.  Introduction1 
In the year 2000, the United Nations set in place eight Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDG) to be reached by 2015 and subsequently defined no less 
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Lucerne, Switzerland; daniel.speich@unilu.ch. 
1  I am indebted to Frederick Cooper and Rainer Diaz-Bone for important comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
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than fifty-three groups of numerical indicators in order to monitor compliance.2 
In 2013, the UN General Secretariat launched a global consultation process 
including an alleged one million individual voices in order to define post-MDG 
procedures.3 This general assessment is an opportunity for looking back at the 
historical roots of the MDG initiative that lie in the history of the statistics of 
economic development and change. One recurrent issue in the ongoing debates 
is the question of whether development indicators are biased towards non-
sustainable economic growth and whether the statistical form of knowledge at 
use needed revision (Morgan 2008; Hibou and Samuel 2011; Jerven 2013). The 
argument here is that before instituting more adequate or better statistics, it might 
be helpful to recall why and how the problem of global economic inequity be-
came almost completely subject to a global statistical gaze in the first place. 
While some of the MDG have clearly been missed and the overall success of 
the initiative is being contested, the UN has achieved through the MDG a very 
effective homogenization of international political discourse. The roots of this 
highly successful form of numerical communication across the North-South 
Divide lie in the political dynamics of decolonization. 
It has become a normal assumption that the basic facts and figures about the 
living conditions of the inhabitants of planet Earth are easily available at our 
fingertips.4 Huge sets of data have been gathered over the last decades and an 
enormous progress was achieved since the 1950s in standardizing the procedures 
of data collection, in homogenizing the basic categories, and in constructing 
mathematical tools that allow for their comparison. These figures prove facts and 
politicians are invited to govern accordingly. Statistics have become part and 
parcel of a computerized global social reality and they are constantly being re-
ferred to as possible agents of change. But the historians of international politics 
have so far not been very interested in studying the making of a planetary statis-
tics craze, of which the Millennium Development Goals bear witness. We are 
neither well informed about the origins of global statistics nor about their his-
torical dynamics. A recent German textbook on international history, for exam-
ple, completely ignores the technical dimension (Dülffer and Loth 2012). When 
taking modern world politics into view, historians tend to neglect technical 
internationalism (Speich Chassé 2014) because their competencies are strong in 
the analysis of political deliberations but comparably weak in the study of the 
underlying social-scientific framework. Statistical data are frequently used as a 
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(Accessed January 13, 2015). 
4  The Universities of Pennsylvania and of Groningen as well as the World Bank host such data. 
See <http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table> (Accessed January 8, 2015) 
and the “World Development Indicators” at <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators> (Accessed January 8, 2015). 
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kind of reality-check in consigning past politicians’ room of manœuvre but are 
only rarely made a subject of historical study in themselves.  
In what follows, I suggest some guidelines for writing the history of global 
statistics by drawing upon recent French sociology (Diaz-Bone 2015). Two 
findings seem important. First is the observation that statistical facts are the 
result of conventions and still work as the real. Reality and conventionality 
need not be considered as the two opposites in a representational order but 
rather fuse into one world of material concerns. Matters of fact are inseparable 
from, and constitutive to, all matters of concern (Latour 2004). Second, this has 
consequences for the analysis of power. Modern governmental authority has 
increasingly been expressed through the working of numbers while statistics 
gained strength as a representation of the real, because they were linked to 
centers of power. Historically, there was a co-construction of scientific statis-
tics and power regimes. Or to put it in the shorthand suggested by Alain 
Desrosières: modernity means that proving and governing became closely 
intertwined (Desrosières 2014). These findings invite the historian of global 
statistics not to separate between the intellectual history of social-scientific 
knowledge on the one hand, and the political history of governing practices on 
the other hand. Rather, the scientific production and the political use of statis-
tics need be assessed in a combined narrative.  
As a matter of historical fact, the predominant political concern in moderni-
ty, the building of nations, could never have been imagined collectively with-
out the compilation of numerical data. As Desrosières and others (Sandl 1999; 
Behrisch 2015) showed, philosophical conceptions of the state in late 18th 
century produced a specific demand for statistical knowledge, which then 
helped the new conceptions of the state to materialize. Desrosières borrowed 
from Abbé Sieyes the term “Adunation” to name the process of unifying the 
manifold systems of reference to the nation (Desrosières 1998). The category 
of the nation was one of the foremost effects of statistics and numbers have 
helped strengthening national institutions. Recent historical studies on Germa-
ny and the United States have substantiated this twofold connection for the 
1930s (Tooze 2001; Didier 2009). But what about the international realm in 
which the Millennium Development Goals are located? Global political com-
munication at the closing of the 20th century was intrinsically connected to 
comparative statistics of all kinds. According to Wendy Espeland, social scien-
tific quantification has become “a peculiar modern ontology, in which the real 
easily becomes coextensive with what is measurable” (Espeland and Stevens 
2010, 432). Bettina Heintz posits that numbers generate objectivity and offer a 
kind of generalized language which objectifies social difference. According to 
her, assumed political neutrality makes numbers especially well-suited for 
communication on political cleavages and difference (Heintz 2012). The lead-
ing question of this paper is to what extent a co-construction of statistics and 
political institutions can also be found in the analysis of global statistics. 
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In order to address this issue, the paper asks which institutions have histori-
cally produced knowledge about economic development on a planetary scale. It 
considers global statistical interaction with a focus on East Africa, because one 
of the MDG masterminds, the economist Jeffrey D. Sachs, ventured out from 
the Olympic world of international institutions to the Western Kenyan province 
of Nyanza, where a village called Sauri became his testing ground (Sachs 2005, 
ch. 12). East Africa played a crucial role when it came to localizing the MDG 
initiative after the Millennium. It thus seems important to substantiate local 
historical trajectories. The first section of the paper reconstructs the high hopes 
that were connected to the end of European imperialism in East Africa around 
1960. In this, international organizations such as the UN were of special im-
portance because they incorporated the promise of a rational way of governing 
the world (Mazower 2012). However, the assumption of a globally transparent 
space proved largely fictitious. Upon closer scrutiny, a certain tension arises 
between the political use of global statistical figures and the contingencies in 
their making. The second section dwells on the ambivalent record of late impe-
rial rule in statistical matters. The East African experience shows that the mod-
ern statistical imagination not only cleaned up the intricacies of social life, but 
also produced a chaotic backside to this governmental fiction. With respect to 
the economic development of poor countries the name for this backside was the 
non-Western world. Colonial bureaucrats were unable to cope with the mathe-
matic tools of social-scientific inquiry that came to dominate the domestic 
policy of industrialized countries in the course of the 1930s’ economic crisis. 
But precisely this mode of “Adunation” became a global template in the second 
half of the 20th century. The third section recalls that the statistical tools of 
governance are intrinsically connected to the political form of the modern 
nation. A methodical nationalism is built into them that was largely useless for 
the purposes of imperial rule but warmly welcomed by the first generation of 
African politicians at the moment of imperial decline. The final section con-
nects their developmentalism to the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals. They were defined following a critical discussion in the 1980s that 
wanted to highlight the prospects of the individual vis-à-vis the dominant fic-
tion of nation-centric growth (Ul Haq 1995). Global statistics cannot easily be 
connected to the emergence of a single center of power. 
2.  The UN and Independence in East Africa 
Starting in 1947 the United Nations built up a worldwide system of regional 
bodies that focused on the construction of development knowledge (Berthelot 
2003). The first were an UN Regional Commission for Europe located in Ge-
neva, and a same-such organ for Asia and the Pacific in Bangkok, Thailand. 
Then Santiago de Chile became the main seat of a UN Regional Economic 
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Commission for Latin America. This Latin American UN Commission strongly 
influenced UN development discourse through comparative statistical work 
because its General Secretary Raul Prebisch voiced new theories of global 
economic dependency (Dosman 2008). Next was Africa. The Ethiopian Emperor 
Haile Selassie I opened the first session of the UN Commission in Addis Ababa 
in 1958. He financed the construction of new buildings and connected their inau-
guration to a very strong African discourse of postcolonial independence. He had 
commissioned the Ethiopian artist Afewerk Teklé to design a huge transparent 
window panel in the new premises called “Africa Hall.” It bore witness to an 
independent African perspective by depicting the UN as a medieval knight who 
would safeguard the continent against foreign domination. 
At the opening ceremony, Haile Selassie I is reported to have said that, in 
this building, the UN would allow Africans from all parts of the continent – for 
the first time in history – to sit together on African soil in order to debate the 
future of their countries in a self-determined way. And Mekki Abbas, the first 
Executive Secretary of the African Regional Commission, understood the 
founding moment as the most important date in recent African history,5 as it 
symbolically marked the end of colonial rule. The artist Afewerk Teklé con-
nected this rhetoric of an African rebirth to Ethiopian Coptic theology and put a 
huge figure of an African Messiah at the center of his transparent glass compo-
sition against which the UN knight was dwarfed. 
We can understand this African episode as one clear expression of a promise 
that was voiced by US President Harry Truman in his inaugural speech in 1949. 
Truman’s program of US postwar policy stated four points: first was an uncon-
ditional commitment of the United States to the United Nations; second and 
third were the tasks of reconstructing Western Europe economically and with 
respect to military security. And, fourth, Truman designed a worldwide devel-
opment scheme in order to eradicate poverty and global economic inequality. 
Statistics and technical knowledge were the American President’s first objec-
tive. The founding of the UN Regional Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa 
aimed at making the benefits of Western scientific advances and industrial 
progress available to the relatively poor new African countries. The United 
Nations Regional Economic Commission for Africa was founded as a kind of 
“clearinghouse for skills and ‘knowhow’” (Lie 1954, 146). It had no executive 
power and could not open up funding for development investments, but it im-
mediately started collecting knowledge and expertise. Around 1960, scientists 
from Europe, Australia, Asia, the Americas, and Africa ventured on the Com-
missions’ behalf into a series of surveys on all possible aspects of African 
development and one academic gathering followed the other inside Africa Hall. 
Economic statistics were held to be the chief informant and agent of change. 
                                                             
5  Commission Economique pour l’Afrique: Rapport sur la première session (29.12.1958-
06.01.1959). E/3201 E/CN.14/18. 
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The leading idea was to carefully revise the existing body of development 
techniques and investigate into its adaptation to African demands. The African 
commission under Mekki Abbas, then Robert Gardiner, and later Adebayo 
Adedeji, aimed at designing a specifically African body of development 
knowledge (Misteli 2015). The relative underdevelopment of Africa was under-
stood as a consequence of imperial partiality and arcane administrative tech-
niques. Now, the transparency of modern rationality should tear down imperial 
segregation and build the foundation for a unified modernizing continent that 
would play a self-determined and important role in the world economy (Cooper 
1981). To Africans of the first generation at independence, the technocratic UN 
approach seemed a plausible way of making their pan-African visions of unity 
become real. Pan-African visions of unity also gave rise to the founding of the 
Organization of African Unity a few years later in Addis Ababa. Thus, much to 
the satisfaction of Haile Selassie I, the Ethiopian capital became a hub of Afri-
can science and technology based modernization and unification.  
One important issue in these debates was a new technique of comparative 
macroeconomic measurement. It had become important for international ex-
perts to indicate a sum total of national productivity as expressed in the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for every territory or nation state that was to be de-
veloped. Macroeconomic data could be combined with a population census 
resulting in the GDP per capita. This indicator could then be subjected to a time 
series analysis resulting in a growth rate of the GDP per capita. For internation-
al bureaucrats, this indicator was an absolute necessity in order to reduce the 
complexity of world economic dynamics. And to African nationalists, this 
comparative statistical knowledge was very helpful in two respects: Indicating 
a GDP per capita growth rate allowed them to formulate spectacular promises 
of future wealth to their people at home. And at the same time, this transparent 
language enabled them to prove the relative poverty of their nation vis-à-vis the 
rich industrial countries. This comparison was important to legitimize a mas-
sive quest for financial development aid in the course of decolonization and to 
mark sovereignty (Speich Chassé 2011, 2013). One Western observer of the 
early 1960s “Wind of Change” over Africa waggishly reckoned after having 
assisted to debates in Addis Ababa: “Today in many independent countries 
national accounts are regarded, alongside the national flag and the national 
anthem, as symbols of independence” (Barkay 1963, 85). 
International associations took advantage of the new African location in or-
der to hold their gatherings. A series of meetings of experts in economics took 
place, such as the convention of the International Economic Association, which 
held its yearly conference in 1961 in Ethiopia. This organization had been 
founded a few years earlier by UNESCO and brought together national eco-
nomic professional associations such as the German Verein für Socialpolitik or 
the American Economic Association under one umbrella. Its president was the 
British economist Edward Austin Gossage Robinson, who once had stated as 
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the main task of this body “the carrying of modern economics to parts of the 
world that were out of touch” (Robinson 1964, x). 
According to the British economic statistician Phyllis Deane, who had par-
ticipated in the International Economic Association’s conference, the 1961 
gathering assembled a new set of voices across colonial boundaries. There were 
three distinct pro-development groups of experts in Addis Ababa. “Each of this 
very mixed bag of participants had his own special grain of debatable truth,” 
she said, and continued:  
There were the African speakers, with their stubborn faith in industrialization, 
there were the European Africans, with their equally stubborn faith in the unique 
virtues of imported capital and enterprise; and there were the international ex-
perts bravely grappling with slippery statistics in the attempt to draw up their 
league tables of comparative economic development (Deane 1965, 422). 
We can connect these groups to different uses of statistics. The first group con-
sisted of African nationalists. They appropriated the promise of modern technol-
ogy in order to reproduce the British historical model of domestic industrializa-
tion in their own new nations. Second were colonial administrators and White 
settlers whom Phyllis Deane called “European Africans.” They picked up the 
new quest for transparency and stressed the importance of cadastral land titles 
and imperial bonds of property rights in order to secure capital flows between 
the metropole and the periphery. And third was a quickly growing new group 
of international bureaucrats who had evolved out of the pre-War League of 
Nations. Their agenda was to depict the planet in a coherent world of numbers. 
In the latter part of the 1960s these three groups molded together into one ho-
mogenous social group of statistically minded international development ex-
perts. They attempted to depoliticize the problem of global economic interac-
tion by compiling assumedly objective statistical tables. And they quite clearly 
shared the view that imperial rule was ending. A more equitable mode of global 
knowledge was requested. 
3.  Africa in Late-Colonial Statistics 
What administrative practices had been in place before 1961 in East Africa? 
What was the use of statistics in British imperial rule? In 1961 the International 
Association for Research in Income and Wealth also convened at Addis Aba-
ba’s Africa Hall. At this expert meeting the use of macroeconomic indicators 
was subject to debate. An official from the East African colonial administrative 
body explained, that the Colony of Kenya did not possess very sophisticated 
statistics. This is remarkable, because Kenya was a Settler colony in which 
more sophisticated modes of colonial rule were in place than for example in the 
Uganda Protectorate. Generally, he indicated “that the basic statistical infor-
mation is quite inadequate in many cases with respect to certain important 
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sectors of the economy” (Kennedy et al. 1963, 389). The British colonial ad-
ministrator at the Addis Ababa conference had to confess that measured against 
the norms of a new international discourse of statistical transparency, British 
colonial administration had little to say. “It is, therefore, not possible to con-
struct a useful series of per capita real incomes. Nor, because of the absence of 
useful price indicators is it possible to produce a satisfactory series showing 
changes in aggregate real domestic product” (Kennedy et al. 1963, 391). Com-
parative economic statistics on a global scale were a mere fantasy according to 
this source: “The National Accounting material is not sufficient to be of great 
help or assistance in development planning; certainly it has not been used in 
East Africa” (Kennedy et al. 1963, 410).  
It is surprising to learn that colonial authorities lacked comprehensive data 
on population and economic potential. Current research emphasizes the moder-
nity of colonial rule. Some authors have suggested understanding the colonies 
as “laboratories of modernization” (van Laak 2004; Tilley 2011). The Indian 
postcolonial scholar Arjun Appadurai has analyzed the cultural conditions of 
expanding European notions of modernity into a global scale. In this, he explic-
itly mentioned numbers and argued that counting was instrumental. He sug-
gested reassessing the study of colonial governmental practices and to further 
inquire into “the ways in which they employ quantification in censuses as well 
as in various other instruments like maps, agrarian survey, racial studies, and a 
variety of other productions of the colonial archive” (Appadurai 1996, 115). 
Recent work on India has followed his proposal. U. Kalpagam showed how the 
East India Company used entrepreneurial bookkeeping in the 19th century in 
order to simplify the representation of socio-economic conditions on the Indian 
sub-continent and thus paved the way for modern (i.e. rational) governmental 
techniques when the British state took over governmental responsibility (Kal-
pagam 2000, 2014). And the anthropologist Akhil Gupta followed this line of 
inquiry into an analysis of the postcolonial Indian states’ development practices 
which have led to a notoriously inefficient bureaucracy (Gupta 2009, 2012). In 
the Indian experience the production of statistics on development clearly has 
colonial roots. Also for Africa such continuities in practice and staffing have 
been observed (Bonneuil 2000; Hodge 2007). But it is still remarkably difficult 
to trace present-day numerical statistics back into the colonial period. In view 
of the quest for statistical transparency that was voiced around 1960 by interna-
tional bureaucrats, settlers, and the nationalist administrators of the newly 
emerging African nations, the British colonial statisticians came under pres-
sure. This finding is historically significant. Obviously we have to be careful in 
imagining colonial rule to have been ultramodern. 
In the European experience, modern national statistics focused on territory, 
on population, and on economic potential. What was the state of the statistical 
art in late British colonial rule? With respect to the cartographic survey of the 
territory, the Kenyan colonial authorities performed fairly well. The Colonial 
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geodetic survey had produced large-scale maps of East Africa that were still in 
use in independent Kenyan administration as late as the 1980s, for example, in 
the management of timber and fuel wood production around Mount Kenya and 
in the Aberdares. In the Coast Province, the creation of a cadaster in order to 
legally secure land titles was conducted in the years between 1915 and 1920, 
but remained highly contested (Cooper 1980, ch. 5). Expanding such a gov-
ernmental venture into inland territories was a major challenge to the District 
Officers. Care had been attributed only to a cadastral survey of the “White 
Highlands” in the Nairobi region, and around Machakos, Nyeri, Nanjuki, Na-
kuru, Kisumu and Eldoret during the 1940s and 1950s. This included the legal 
definition of arable plots in order to administrate the contestation of land be-
tween the white settlers, the Maasai pastoralists and Kikuyu smallholders. It is 
well-established that this governmental intervention into questions of land 
ownership was a concomitant circumstance of the “Mau Mau” uprising during 
the early 1950s (Leys 1971, 320; Leo 1981; Kanogo 1987). Areal statistics 
were a major player in Kenyan history as they simplified land tenure and pro-
duced evidence on paper that successively turned into a physical reality by 
means of expulsion and resettlement. 
With respect to the census of population, the East African colonial record is 
poorer. The counting of populations was an important activity for colonial 
regimes, for the new nations that emerged with decolonization, and for the 
international organizations that since then came into existence (Hartmann and 
Unger 2014). Looking back at the connection between Empire and information, 
counting people had been important for the Early Modern Spaniards as well as 
for the British in 19th century India. Important books have recently appeared 
under the headings of “Imperium und Empirie” (Brendecke 2009) or “Empire 
and Information” (Bayly 1996). It is well known that British colonial adminis-
trators tried to count all heads of population under their rule.6  
But the modern techniques of administration and governance were a huge 
challenge not only to bureaucracies that were confronted with the problem of 
long-distance control (Law 1986, 234 et seq.), but also to the authorities of 
relatively coherent national political bodies within the close bounds of Europe. 
It had been a huge challenge for a highly industrialized and small nation like 
Switzerland to produce adequate aerial statistics and a correct population cen-
sus in the late 19th century (Jost 1995; Gugerli and Speich 2002). In view of 
this record, one can probably not overestimate the problems that the British 
colonial administrators must have had when trying to correctly assess the natu-
ral features or count the number of their legal subjects in vast areas across Asia 
and Africa. The colonies might have worked as “laboratories of modernization” 
in the colonial imagination, but in the daily routines of statisticians working 
                                                             
6  “Almost all the Colonial territories took a population census in either the late war or the 
early postwar years. Nigeria is an exception” (Searle et al. 1950, 18).  
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overseas most probably more modest visions prevailed. The first census in 
Kenya was taken as late as 1948 (Dörnemann 2014). Prior to this date, British 
administrators had but a rough idea of the number of subjects under their rule, 
and knew little about their economic activities. Colonial rule built less on facts 
than on speculation and prejudice (Ferguson 1999, 53). For Uganda, the colo-
nial authorities estimated a head number of 5.7 Million in 1958 and 6.3 Million 
in 1959 – being well aware that this increase was neither due to fertility nor to 
migration but to ignorance (Kennedy et al. 1963, 392). 
With respect to the numerical statistics of economic potential, the African 
record of British imperialism is especially poor. Only in the 1930s did the 
British Colonial Office finance a large-scale statistical survey of its African 
possessions that was coordinated by Lord Hailey. The result was a book with 
over thousand pages – the “African Survey,” published in 1938 (Hailey 1938). 
It included descriptions of different African peoples and regions much in the 
tradition of descriptive statistics (Schlözer 1804). The epistemic basis of this 
statistical work was the qualitative inquiry of anthropology according to 
Bronislaw Malinowski that was en vogue at the time (Malinowski 1929). The 
main idea was to record assumedly ancient forms of collective life that were 
thought to vanish in the course of the colonial civilizing mission (Tilley 2011). 
During this research, one British economist, Edward Austin Gossage Robin-
son, realized the need to more systematically gather quantitative information on 
the economic situation in the African colonies. In 1940, Robinson commissioned 
the young economist Phyllis Deane in 1940 to compile social accounts for South-
ern African territories out of published material. He wanted to apply the latest 
techniques of national income accounting that had been tentatively applied to 
India (Rao 1940), and that had been used by his colleague in the economic pro-
fession, Colin Clark, in a worldwide survey of economic development (Clark 
1940). The idea was testing the usefulness of the new macroeconomic statisti-
cal tools for better planning the economic development of the colonies.  
In domestic British economic policy these new statistical techniques as from 
1940 gradually gained in importance. Within the larger context of Keynesian 
macroeconomic theory these statistics became fundamental tools in planning 
the national economy (Suzuki 2003). Planning generally gained ground in 
political practice during the final years of the Second World War. It is no sur-
prise that this also started to influence the assumptions about how the colonies 
should be ruled. Evidence for such a gradual change is a small pamphlet from 
1944, which wanted to strengthen the public support for colonialism in Great 
Britain. In this book, Phyllis Deane presented early results from her statistical 
work. Many graphs, statistical tables, and carefully chosen pictures gave the 
impression of the colonies as islands of tranquility, order and prosperity. The 
authors stated: “No one will tolerate a return to the unplanned chaos of the 
inter-war years; the chaos of slump and slum, of malnutrition and mass unem-
ployment. A plan is demanded” (Huxley and Deane 1944, 2). In the future, 
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collective life on the British islands as well as in the colonies should be orga-
nized in a rational and transparent way. Statistics were to form a basis. 
But this was not an adequate depiction of African realities. Grace Davie has 
reconstructed the contested nature of knowledge on poverty since 1855 in 
South Africa (Davie 2015). Despite the fact that social scientific inquiries on 
economic issues remained incomplete, their authors always found themselves 
immersed in highly political debates. Phyllis Deane sensed these complica-
tions. When the final results of her study on “The Measurement of Colonial 
National Incomes” were published in 1948, she was very much unsatisfied and 
called her work “An experiment.” In an introductory note to this pioneering 
study, E. A. G. Robinson recalled the difficulties of macroeconomic statistics:  
Any test of their application to the measurement of a more primitive national 
income was [...] difficult, since very few attempts had been made to measure 
colonial national incomes, and none of them were in a form which readily 
permitted an already accumulated body of data to be rearranged to see wheth-
er it could be used to exploit the advantages of the new techniques. Indeed, the 
development of the measurement of colonial national incomes was in itself 
almost a path-breaking task, which was capable of yielding great dividends in 
knowledge of the economic structure and standards of the colonial territories, 
the limits of which I myself had learned to appreciate in working with Lord 
Hailey on his African Survey (Deane 1948, v). 
Systematic quantitative research on economic potentials began in the British 
Empire only in the 1950s. Step by step, the qualitative studies of anthropology 
were replaced by the quantitative arguments of development economics. Insti-
tutionally, in the British context, the “Colonial Social Science Research Coun-
cil” rose with these epistemic movements (Mills 2005). Further studies by 
Phyllis Deane, Alan R. Prest on Nigeria, and Alan Peacock on Tanganyika 
included the collection of data for the compilation of a Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) for the African territories (Deane 1953; Prest and Stewart 1953; Pea-
cock and Dosser 1958). However, all these studies retained a pioneering char-
acter. They all gave single figures on the volume of different economic sectors 
and also compiled sum totals of national products. But they also all strongly 
questioned the usefulness of such macroeconomic statistics for non-Western 
conditions. The statistical tools did not seem to be adequate for African studies, 
because they had been designed for relatively homogenous industrialized na-
tional economies like the USA or England. But the colonies represented a 
different social world. 
4.  Methodological Nationalism 
There is a national bias in the macroeconomic statistics of the Millennium 
Development Goals. The fifty-three groups of numerical indicators that were 
set in place for monitoring compliance all referred to sovereign nations as their 
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basic entity. A methodological nationalism was built into the statistical survey 
of global conditions. Some authors even argued for statistical knowledge to 
have been a major driving force in instituting the nation as a predominant polit-
ical concern in international governance post-1945 (McNeely 1995). In eco-
nomic matters political nations were subject to a comparative order of 
knowledge. A universal structural norm of economic life and an assumedly 
shared outlook of development were set as standards in order to measure mani-
fold historical experiences against each other. But despite their political usabil-
ity such comparative inquiries met strong resistance within the statistical pro-
fession. As Alain Desrosières has pointed out, the “openly political” and the 
“purely learned” institutions working in the field of global statistics show quite 
different trajectories (Desrosières 2013, 13). While politicians were quick to 
use quantitative figures, the learned experts long stayed skeptical. At a confer-
ence of the International Statistical Institute (ISI) in Washington in 1947 schol-
ars refuted the comparing of national incomes on academic grounds but held it 
important pragmatically. One expert said:  
These figures have been produced and people use them. They will continue to 
be produced, and people will continue to use them. If we were starting afresh, 
I would have a great deal of sympathy with what has been said about not using 
a single figure, and not even producing one. But the way the thing stands now 
is that in every governmental problem where a multiplicity of regions or coun-
tries is involved, national income figures are used. [...] And every internation-
al organization that has been formed has used national-income statistics in one 
way or another. Therefore, I think the statistician cannot bury his head in the 
sand in this matter. He should know the practical politicians will use his re-
sults and probably will misuse them. And therefore I do believe that it is im-
perative to make the best single figure that is possible and to use a few very 
simple rules for its application (Gilbert et al. 1949, 270). 
British and US economists hotly debated the possibility of numerically ac-
counting for all sectors and segments of one nation’s economic life. The result 
from this academic discussion was a standardized “System of National Ac-
counts” that was issued in 1952 by the United Nations Statistical Office and the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC 1952). This tool has 
since become the basis for national economic policy in all nations throughout 
the world. Of considerable importance is the fact that these macroeconomic 
statistics also became the basis for the new discipline of development econom-
ics. As early as 1944, economists like Kurt Mandelbaum or Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan applied numerical arguments in designing development advice for rela-
tively poor eastern European countries including Greece, Romania, or Poland 
(Rosenstein-Rodan 1944; Mandelbaum 1945). 
Quantitative findings were very helpful for international politics, because 
they allowed for reducing complex economic interactions into a system of three 
interlocking tables that represented all incomes of the workforce, all outlays of 
the business companies and households and the sum-total of government 
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spending. National accounts formed a factual basis for central decisions con-
cerning the allocation of scarce resources. According to this representation, 
poor countries regularly showed an underused rural workforce. And they also 
showed generally low levels of investment. Thus, within the new discipline of 
development economics, the rate of investment as measured against the total 
GDP became a core issue.  
This is very clear in the first textbook on development economics that was 
ever published, W. Arthur Lewis’ “Theory of economic growth” from 1955. 
The first sentence in his book is: “The subject matter of this book is the growth 
of output per head of population” (Lewis 1955, 9). Lewis continued: “‘Growth 
of output per head of the population’ is rather a long phrase, [...] Most often we 
shall refer only to ‘growth’ or to ‘output,’ or even occasionally, for the sake of 
variety, to ‘progress’ or to ‘development’” (Lewis 1955, 9). From this concise 
definition of the main topic Lewis set out over a long and highly sophisticated 
argumentation to conclude that all development policies had to focus on in-
vestment quotas. He concluded that:  
the central problem in the theory of economic growth is to understand the pro-
cess by which a community is converted from being a 5 per cent to a 12 per 
cent saver – with all the changes in attitudes, in institutions and in techniques 
which accompany this conversion” (Lewis 1955, 226).  
The main avenue to effect this change was to open up capital transfers in the 
form of development aid and foreign direct investment. Once large investment 
capital sums were available, they would trickle down, miraculously multiply 
and effect an equitable distribution of general gains in wealth – so ran the base-
line of the new statistically minded development policy. 
This specific mode of knowledge production, analysis, and policy advice 
was completely grounded in a statistical depiction of the nation. Indeed, the 
national body politic was reproduced and reified in all applied categories. Eco-
nomic circumstances became identical with the nation and economic life was 
seen as a mechanical device that could be made more efficient by clever engi-
neers in order to further a nation’s strength. In this connection, Timothy Mitch-
ell has spoken of the invention of the “economy” as a thing (Mitchell 1998). 
Such an objective vision materialized in a machine that was built out of tubes, 
valves and containers in London in the 1940s. The economist Bill Philips con-
structed this technical array to represent the flow of economic wealth within a 
national economy according to the theory of John Maynard Keynes. The Lon-
don Science Museum holds his accomplishment to humanity on constant dis-
play. The Phillips-Machine is a tool for governing social collectives. It visual-
izes a system of national accounts that produced out of the anonymous 
multitude of statistical instances the central position of an omnipotent planner. 
Colonial administrators in East Africa never reached such a position. Dis-
trict officers in the Kenyan Coast Province, in the Highlands, or in Nyanza had 
to deal with a multitude of social collectives. On the ground, the logic of impe-
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rial rule produced the notion of “tribes” that all had different ways of organiz-
ing economic reproduction. Some quantitative estimates were made, but local 
staff reported stark differences in attitudes towards work, agriculture, and fami-
ly life (Cooper 1980). The rural-urban migration that was incised by the colo-
nial regime further complicated the analysis (Ferguson 1999). Colonial statisti-
cians thought of Africa not in the terms of nations, but saw a complicated 
network of tribal interaction that they had to administrate. To this logic, the 
statistical view of single developmental nations was a full contrast. It proved 
very attractive to African nationalist politicians at the moment of decoloniza-
tion because such expert-driven economic policy could strengthen their domes-
tic legitimacy as rulers across tribal difference. The global statistical view also 
promised to stabilize new relations of power with the former colonial over-
lords. The first generation of African leaders turned the national bias of statis-
tics into a tool for the building of new nations (Speich Chassé 2008). 
Unleashing national machines of development – as were visualized in the 
London Museum’s Philipps’ Machine – brought a new global imagination to 
the fore that made all socio-economic problems of the world appear as prob-
lems of national development. The Millennium Development Goals still stuck 
to this methodological nationalism by imagining a global developmental rank-
ing of nations. In postcolonial Africa, these assumedly rational techniques of 
executing and legitimizing political power offered a way of instituting new 
nations that were materially inexistent. In the imagination of the heroes of 
African independence such as Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana or Tom Mboya in 
Kenya, political sovereignty necessarily had to be followed by major schemes 
of statistically rendering the body politic in view of national development goals 
(Speich Chassé 2009). But they needed a stable comparative framework in 
order to legitimize their claims. Following a technical internationalism, non-
governmental, international and supranational bodies such as the International 
Statistical Institute (ISI), the many associations that gathered in Africa Hall in 
the 1960s, or the statistical division of the UN built up respective bases of 
knowledge (Speich Chassé 2011, 2013). 
5.  Conclusion 
The Millennium Development Goals represent a new form of “global govern-
ance” that is working without formal government structures. In questioning 
their historical roots it seems relevant to ask which institutions issued those 
statistics through which global problems are increasingly being approached. As 
Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau famously stated: “The concept of 
governance without government is especially conductive to the study of world 
politics inasmuch as centralized authority is conspicuously absent from this 
domain of human affairs” (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, 24). Historians of 
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statistics have so far not very often studied cases in which central authorities 
were absent. But this is the main feature of global statistics. 
Despite the ubiquitous proliferation of statistics that began with the end of 
the Second World War, no single center of calculation has emerged and no 
single government rules the world until today. After 1989, the legacy of a Pax 
Americana has gained ground in historical explanations. But such analyses are 
overly simplifying. The statistical check of the Millennium Development Goals 
depends on aerial surveys, the census of populations, and the accounting of 
potentials for economic growth. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States 
of America can be held responsible for an order of global knowledge that 
emerged in the period of the Cold War. Rather, a planetary statistical frame-
work came into existence that put the comparison of national numbers at its 
core. It epistemically strengthened at the same time the foreign policies of 
powerful industrialized countries and national self-determination against for-
eign domination in the new states of the Global South. 
Comparative economic statistics were very important in turning the whole 
world into something readable. According to Hans Blumenberg, the phenome-
nal world is not openly accessible to modern knowledge production. It is not 
lying out there ready to be read, but must be processed in order to become so 
(Blumenberg 1986 [1993]). This means that, as historians, we can reconstruct 
the composition of whole sets of practices that were necessary in order to sub-
ject complicated phenomena to governance. Global economic inequality cer-
tainly is one such phenomenon that is not accessible without highly sophisti-
cated tools of knowledge. The problem of development only acquired 
readability through the constant work of scholars like Phyllis Deane or W. 
Arthur Lewis, and through institutions like the United Nations in Addis Ababa. 
With respect to global governance, the roots of this readability of the world 
date back to late colonial rule. Then the ILO and the League of Nations started 
compiling tables of comparative economic development. But this statistical 
worldview was still contested around 1960. In her account of one international 
conference at the Addis Ababa Africa Hall, Phyllis Deane singled out “interna-
tional experts bravely grappling with slippery statistics” (Deane 1965, 422). In 
the years 1961-1962, the economist Wolfgang Stolper designed the first Na-
tional Development Plan for Nigeria calling this task “planning without facts” 
(Stolper 1966). Deane’s research and the work by Prest and Peacock on Nigeria 
and Tanganyika had explored the limits of statistical transparency. However, 
today, we do not assume anymore these statistics to be slippery. With the UN 
statistical manual on a “System of National Accounts” (1952) and with the 
globalization of Keynesian macroeconomic theory post-1945 (Hall 1989; Four-
cade 2009), a mechanical metaphor of the national economy became a reality. 
International bureaucrats strongly advanced this move, because for them seem-
ingly objective indicators like the growth rate of the GDP per capita were an 
absolute necessity in order to reduce the complexity of the world. Thus, as of 
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the early 1960s, a new comparative statistical perception of the world became 
dominant. It was inherently anti-imperial because the concept of independent 
nations was its basic entity. It functioned without a clear-cut center of calcula-
tion (Latour 1987), and it still gave rise to the Millennium Development Goals. 
In the age of imperial decline, statistics and development fostered a new in-
terest in rendering global conditions rational and transparent. As the Millenni-
um Development Goals show, this vision is still with us today. But the condi-
tions of its emergence have become opaque. The main argument is that we 
need to investigate the technical history that made this simplified worldview 
possible. In doing so, further research seems necessary first into the history of 
colonial statistical surveys which found themselves locked in an epistemic 
dead-end around the year 1960. It might be helpful to focus on the uncertainties 
of units of analysis in this earlier period such as “tribe,” district, region, territo-
ry, federation, or Empire. Second, we have to investigate early political voices 
from the Global South who followed the promises of transparency. And third, 
the emergence of new international organizations like the United Nations is an 
important field of future research. 
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